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When Death Becomes a Celebration

Writer: Manu Kurup
Manu Kurup
Sep 12
7 min read

We are taught that death demands a certain dignity. Whatever our feelings about a person, the conventional response to their passing is restraint: condolences for the family, a moment of silence, perhaps an acknowledgment of the good they did. Yet this convention breaks down spectacularly when a deeply polarising public figure dies. Instead of grief, there may be laughter; instead of Rest in Peace, there may be Good riddance; instead of sympathy, there may be an almost celebratory sense of relief. This is particularly true when people believe that the dead person used their power, fame or public platform to cause harm. Their death can then be experienced not simply as the end of a human life, but as the end of an influence, an ideology, a threat or a source of suffering. Social media has made these reactions instantaneous and collective, turning the death of a controversial figure into a strange public referendum on their life. But there is an uncomfortable question at the heart of it: when we celebrate the death of someone we believe was cruel, are we celebrating the end of their cruelty—or have we simply found a socially acceptable occasion to be cruel ourselves?

One of the most striking modern examples is the American radio personality Rush Limbaugh, who died in February 2021 at the age of seventy. For more than three decades, Limbaugh was one of the most influential voices in American conservative media. His nationally syndicated radio programme reached millions of listeners and helped transform political talk radio into a formidable force in American politics. To conservatives, he was a brilliant, fearless broadcaster who articulated frustrations that mainstream media supposedly ignored. To many liberals and progressives, however, he represented something considerably more sinister: a media personality who had made ridicule, provocation and personal humiliation central to political discourse.




Limbaugh did not merely disagree with his political opponents. He often turned them into caricatures. Feminists became "feminazis"; environmentalists were mocked; Democratic politicians were routinely portrayed as dishonest or malicious; and liberalism itself was frequently presented not as a competing political philosophy but as something fundamentally ridiculous or dangerous. His genius, if one wants to call it that, lay partly in understanding that outrage was good radio. The more provocative the statement, the more likely it was to be repeated, debated and remembered. Controversy was not an accidental by-product of the Limbaugh phenomenon. It was part of the product.

Some of his controversies, however, went well beyond robust political provocation. In 2006, actor Michael J. Fox appeared in a political advertisement supporting candidates who favoured embryonic stem-cell research. Fox had Parkinson's disease and his physical symptoms were plainly visible. Limbaugh suggested that Fox was either exaggerating his symptoms or had deliberately gone off his medication to make himself appear more impaired. Fox's illness had become part of a political argument that had nothing to do with his dignity or his private life. Limbaugh later apologised, but the episode became one of the most enduring examples of the broadcaster's willingness to use another person's vulnerability as political ammunition.


Then came Sandra Fluke. In 2012, Fluke, a Georgetown law student, spoke publicly about the importance of insurance coverage for contraception. Limbaugh could have attacked her argument, questioned the evidence or challenged the economics of contraceptive coverage. Instead, he attacked her sexually, repeatedly calling her a "slut" and a "prostitute" and making crude remarks about her supposed sexual behaviour. What had begun as a debate about healthcare policy became a public humiliation of a young woman. The backlash was considerable, advertisers withdrew from his programme, and Limbaugh eventually apologised.

His record on race was similarly controversial.


In 2003, while briefly working for ESPN, Limbaugh suggested that Philadelphia Eagles quarterback Donovan McNabb was overrated because the media wanted to see a successful Black quarterback. Limbaugh maintained that he was criticising racial preferences in sports journalism rather than McNabb because he was Black. But his critics argued that the premise itself reduced an accomplished athlete's success to a racial stereotype. The controversy became so intense that Limbaugh resigned from ESPN.

He was also responsible for some extraordinarily provocative uses of racial language during Barack Obama's rise to power. Limbaugh promoted a parody called "Barack the Magic Negro", defending it as satire directed at what he regarded as liberal racial hypocrisy. His defence is worth considering rather than simply dismissing: satire does sometimes deliberately employ offensive language to expose prejudice. But satire does not automatically become harmless because the speaker claims an ironic intention. A racial stereotype can still reproduce the very language it supposedly seeks to expose.

Perhaps the most disturbing chapter of Limbaugh's career concerned AIDS. During the height of the AIDS crisis, he ran a segment called "AIDS Update", in which he used the deaths of AIDS victims as material for ridicule. He also played "Another One Bites the Dust" in connection with people who had died from AIDS. This was happening at a time when HIV/AIDS was already accompanied by extraordinary fear, misinformation and stigma, particularly against gay men. For people who lived through that period, such jokes were not simply offensive political humour. They were reminders of a culture in which illness and sexuality had become grounds for social contempt.

There were also serious questions about Limbaugh's relationship with factual accuracy. He repeatedly promoted claims about Barack Obama and his administration that were later found to be false or unsupported. He suggested, for example, that Obama's administration was turning NASA into a form of Muslim outreach, and made unsupported claims about the administration's involvement in the 2014 influx of migrant children at the U.S.-Mexico border. He also made misleading claims about climate change and hurricanes. The problem here is different from offensive language. A broadcaster with millions of listeners has considerable epistemic power. When speculation is delivered with the confidence of established fact, entertainment can become misinformation.

And yet Limbaugh's supporters would argue that this catalogue tells only half the story. He was not merely an angry man with a microphone. He was an extraordinarily talented broadcaster who understood his audience, possessed a distinctive comic timing and developed a form of political communication that permanently altered American media. He gave millions of conservative Americans the feeling that someone was finally speaking for them. He helped create the template for much of the partisan media ecosystem that followed. His influence on American conservatism was immense precisely because he understood something fundamental about modern mass communication: people do not always want information presented neutrally. They want someone to interpret the world for them, identify the villains and tell them whom to distrust.

That helps explain what happened when he died.

Limbaugh announced in February 2020 that he had advanced lung cancer. He continued broadcasting while undergoing treatment and died on 17 February 2021 from complications of the disease. He was seventy. His supporters mourned him as an American conservative icon. Donald Trump, who had awarded Limbaugh the Presidential Medal of Freedom the previous year, praised him as an extraordinary figure. Conservatives described him as a courageous voice who had spent his career fighting for causes in which he believed.


But among his opponents, the reaction was startlingly different. Instead of the customary language of condolences, social media filled with expressions such as "Good riddance", "Rest in piss" and "Rot in hell". Actor David Cross offered perhaps the most brutally concise joke: "Cancer killed the cancer." Other public figures described Limbaugh as one of the most harmful and poisonous figures in modern American political life. Actor Billy Eichner reduced his legacy to the words: "Hate was the brand." Some people openly celebrated the fact that he was dead.

There was something almost symmetrical about this response. Limbaugh had spent much of his career treating political opponents with contempt, ridicule and personal hostility. Now, in death, some of those opponents returned the same currency. The person who had made other people's vulnerabilities part of his political entertainment had himself become the object of jokes about illness and death.




But does that make the reaction justified?

That is where the question becomes considerably more interesting than the simple debate over whether Limbaugh was a good or bad man. Death does not erase a person's actions. We do not stop condemning dictators, tyrants, racists or propagandists merely because they are dead. Historical judgement would become impossible if death automatically granted moral immunity. There is no reason to pretend that someone was admirable simply because their life has ended.

But there is a difference between refusing to sanitise someone's legacy and celebrating their suffering.

One can say, "Limbaugh caused enormous harm" without saying, "I am delighted that he died." One can say, "I am relieved that he can no longer influence millions of people" without taking pleasure in the fact that he suffered from cancer. One can refuse to honour a person without celebrating their death. These may appear like semantic distinctions, but ethically they are significant.

Perhaps the strongest argument made by those who celebrated Limbaugh's death was that his death represented the removal of a powerful source of harm. If someone spends decades using an enormous public platform to spread what we believe to be hatred, misinformation or dehumanisation, then the disappearance of that platform can reasonably produce relief. A person may even feel happiness at the knowledge that the influence has ended.

But that is not quite the same thing as happiness at someone's death.

And perhaps that distinction tells us something important about ourselves. It is easy to be compassionate toward people we admire. It is considerably harder to retain compassion for someone whose ideas we find repulsive and whose actions we believe have harmed others. The true test of our moral principles may not be how we behave toward the people we love, but whether those principles survive when their object is someone we profoundly despise.

The celebration of a polarising person's death therefore tells us two stories. One is about the person who died: what they said, what they did, whom they harmed and what they represented. The other is about those who watched them die: what they remember, what they hated, what they believe has been lost or gained, and what they are willing to say once the person can no longer answer.

Perhaps, then, death does not require forgiveness. It does not require admiration. It does not even require silence.

But it might require us to make one distinction very carefully.

Are we celebrating the end of someone's power to cause harm—or are we celebrating their suffering simply because we hated them?

The first may be defensible. The second should make us pause. And that pause may be the last dignity we owe not to the dead, but to ourselves.


 
 
 

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